Will Ukraine negotiations be friendly? Will it be Trump versus Putin or Trump plus Putin?

By: Ricardo Israel - 28/01/2025

On January 22, Trump said he was ready to meet Putin “immediately” to negotiate peace in Ukraine and that Zelensky was open to making deals with Moscow. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, through whom Putin often speaks, responded that the Russian leader was also available.

Does this mean that everything will go according to what Trump announced during the presidential campaign? That in his first presidency he had established such a relationship with his Russian counterpart that if he had been in office there would not have been an invasion and that a ceasefire could be reached within 24 hours. To give a more realistic view of what could be expected, Trump added a threat to the previous carrot the next day, in the sense that if Russia did not give in in future talks, sanctions greater than the existing ones would be applied, since they would include high tariffs on everything that the US continues to buy from it. To this, the Kremlin spokesman added to the usual response that they are waiting for “signals” from Washington, opening a question mark.

So what can we expect from these future negotiations? First of all, we know that the signals from the US are that a quick ceasefire is desired, and that in the new scenario the kind of support that kyiv received is not sustainable, nor is there support from the electorate for the huge amounts that this support entails. Moreover, Zelensky was preparing his people for this change of priorities even before the election. We also know that Europe's role will diminish, as there have been political changes that bring some countries closer to Putin and that the governments of France and Germany are going through a bad time, as is that of the United Kingdom. In addition, the economic outlook is not good, which is also expressed in a rather careful attitude towards Trump, which is quite a novelty in relation to the difficult relationship that existed in his previous government, but sometimes with a tone of moral superiority, which is nowhere to be seen now, especially given the deterioration that is seen in the German economy.

The answer to what to expect from negotiations that everything indicates will soon begin is contaminated by at least three factors. The first has to do with what surrounds Trump and Putin, since almost everyone believes they have a formed opinion about them, made up of impressions rather than knowledge, an attitude where negativity and rejection predominate.

Second, what emerges from much of the traditional press is generally similar in its passion to what is found on social media, which also does not help to understand what is coming to the world, given the importance of the fact that the first war of this nature is taking place on European soil, that is, the first global conflict of the 21st century.

Third, both main contenders are exhausted, and the war has been bogged down for some time, but neither side has lost the will to fight, which makes it different from what happened between the Koreas, where the ceasefire has become the border between the two countries. Here, what prevails is what the Chinese general and philosopher Sun Tzu (born 544 BC) taught in the “Art of War”: that war only ends when the will to fight is exhausted, which has not happened, or what the main theorist of war, the German Carl von Clausewitz, wrote in the 19th century in his famous definition that it was the continuation of politics by other means.

My opinion is that everything will depend on the expectations surrounding these negotiations, in the sense that the more limited they are, the greater the success will be, that is, if they limit themselves to discussing the issue of the ceasefire without incorporating other issues, the better the result will be, knowing that on the one hand, if support in money and weapons decreases, Ukraine will have no other choice, and in the case of Russia, no matter how much it hopes to reap its current success on the battlefield, if there is no lifting of sanctions or if China withdraws its support, no matter how much it has been successful in transforming its economy into a war economy or no matter how much the sanctions have not stopped its military machinery, it will not be able to continue it in a good way.

It is also confusing to analyze that what Trump wants or can do is contaminated by a fact of domestic US politics, since when politics became polarized something was added for which there is no evidence, since in the campaign in which Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in 2016 the so-called “Russian plot” was invented, according to which Putin would have influenced that election to such an extent that his participation would have been decisive for Trump’s victory. Today we know that this did not happen, at least not in those terms.

We also know today that in terms of relations between countries and states, relations were not easy, unlike personal relations where everything went more smoothly, since it seems that both countries came away with a good opinion of each other and liked each other. However, contrary to what the international media reported, this did not happen in political or economic relations.

Thus, nothing important changed in Russia's favour in those years, financially or economically, nor in politics, as two examples can serve as proof or example. The first is that between 2016 and 2020 there was no major progress in terms of arms treaties, and we now know that during the Trump years, the US and NATO continued to collaborate to modernise the Ukrainian army and begin the transition from Soviet to Western doctrine, both in terms of training and use of weapons.

A second fact is that, in those same years, not only the government, but also Trump personally, criticized the oil and gas agreement between Angela Merkel's Germany and Russia, maintaining criticism of the oil agreements as well as the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline (number 2 was blown up during the war), vetoes that were only lifted when Biden arrived at the White House.

In other words, however much the words were of respect and good will, contrary to the narrative that was imposed, the facts show that state-to-state relations were difficult strategically and without political or economic advantages, which also led to the fact that, due to the lack of an agreement, there was no significant progress in reducing arms or in the type of weapons that each side was authorized to produce. In that sense, what the Russians did, without the US subsequently reacting, was to move to places that were not punished by the current treaty, and they simply did not reduce, but did modernize their nuclear weapons as well as develop new weapons such as hypersonic weapons, both sectors where they now have advantages over the US.

My impression and opinion is that no matter how much they respect each other, Trump and Putin, just as in the period from 2016 to 2020, are going to be tough negotiators, who will put the interests of their respective countries above any other consideration, so the negotiation to end the war in Ukraine is going to be difficult if other issues are to be added, and the ideal, for both of them and above all, for the invaded Ukraine, will be the examples of Korea in 1953 and of Israel with the Arab countries in 1949, to limit themselves to simple ceasefires.

Today, due to the stalemate, there is no prospect of total defeat of the other, and therefore the benefits are very minor in relation to the cost that the meager advances mean for both. A real problem would be if Putin (and it would not be unusual) introduced into the negotiation an issue that has been pending since the end of the former USSR. Let us remember that the disintegration was rapid, so much so that that country disappeared to give rise to 15 new republics. Putin has always argued, something that according to Gorbachev was offered to them, that it was the negotiation of what would come next, and where Putin points out 0x that there was no definition of the borders to avoid future conflicts (examples would be Crimea and Nagorno Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the latter) nor of the status of Russia as a continuation of the Soviet state, on issues such as, for example, nuclear weapons or that of the Russian minorities that were distributed in the new countries.

The truth is that there are many powder kegs that can explode or be manipulated in what was once the USSR, since it was not only a country but the form that the Tsarist empire acquired under communism, and that is expressed in many elements of Putin's current foreign policy, even though his thing is the restoration of the Tsarist empire and not communism, being personally anti-communist. And without going any further, the 19th century Latin American history is full of wars for reasons of border delimitation in what was once the Spanish empire, as well as to this day, the disappearance of the Ottoman empire after the First World War produced various wars in the Middle East, and just as the administrative separation of the Spanish empire was in general the border of the new countries, something similar is applicable to the Ottoman satrapies and the birth of new countries in that region.

Only by limiting the negotiations to a ceasefire can good and quick results be obtained, but this may not be easy due to the characteristics of both Trump and Putin, since both feel like providential men for their nations, and, in fact, it is not easy to write about both, since there is a whole blanket of preconceived ideas, which makes it very difficult to try to understand them rather than judge them.

In this regard, my experience with Trump, where there are people very close to him who have distanced themselves just to try to understand what kind of government he is or aspires to be and to try to do so dispassionately and reach definitions that do not resort to flattery or condemnation. There is even an institution that for years decided not to debate about his government, to avoid internal breakdown or division. Something else, being Chilean, it strikes me that living in the US I have found myself in the situation of preferring to keep my opinion to myself, so as not to cause discomfort and not to express my opinion in various meetings, except that, in Chile, even living in a dictatorship, I never hid my opinion contrary to that dictatorship. Furthermore, I did my master's thesis in Essex on the Pinochet government and my doctoral dissertation on the Allende government and I only had good reactions from those same people, despite the complexity of both topics in 20th century Chilean history.

Less tolerance for different opinions? It may be a characteristic of the times we live in, as well as being a testament to the dangers that freedom of expression faces today, which is facing difficult times like never before, which, by the way, would not bother me so much, if it were not for the fact that it comes from people I appreciated, and how difficult it is to maintain intellectual independence.

So how do we define the Trump administration? How do we do it without falling into offense or flattery? Curiously, it is easier to start with what it is not than with what it is, following the trail left by its decisions rather than by its opinions. Neither the label of Nazi nor some guru helps much, since it is not defined by the old and increasingly less relevant distinction between right or left, nor does some non-applicable variety of populism help much, nor does defining it based on the sympathy or, more likely, the antipathy that we have for its style or person. Nor does it seem to subscribe internationally to any great school, neither that of the liberal world nor Kissinger-style realism.

There is no doubt that his characteristics require a case-by-case approach. To begin with, his most relevant economic decisions are those that have to do with geopolitics, which is where his legacy may be greatest, especially if the analyst is guided by his greater or lesser attachment to MAGA, Make America Great Again. In international matters, he does not seem to belong to any major school, but he has made decisions that seem to place him in a 21st century version of the 19th century Monroe Doctrine, only this time it is not against the Europe of that time, but against communist China, and, therefore, relevant decisions are motivated by the geopolitical struggle for the superpower position between China and the US.

This time, he comes to the government in the 47th administration, much better prepared than when he took office on January 20, 2017, in the 45th. In addition, with two distinctive seals, appointments already prepared with name and surname upon winning the election, the fundamental element being loyalty to him and to the government program, and second, appointing as special envoys, people of business origin, always emphasizing that in his opinion, they would be good negotiators, reaffirming something that also appears in the text that best helps to understand many of his decisions, which is not a treaty or study text, but the book that I invite you to read to better understand what is coming, the one he wrote with a journalist and that was a best seller many years ago, the "Art of Negotiation."

A prominent element in his character is the issue of the cultural war that has been experienced in the US for years, which is known as the cultural war. Here, in his early decisions, anti-wokeism and seeking to roll back the progressivism that has predominated in recent years, from the media to universities and from NGOs to the foreign policy of Western countries, figure prominently.

Economically, Trump wants to relaunch US capitalism and he ratified it in Davos through a virtual intervention. There he said that his message was “very simple: come and manufacture your product in the US” by offering low taxes and facilities superior to other countries. Something similar to what was done with the Saudi monarchy and Japanese businessmen. By the way, Davos represents the very essence of capitalism in the 21st century, but the difference is that it is an expression of globalism, which Trump is not, since his speech is that of America First, MAGA and the Monroe Doctrine revisited. That, artificial intelligence, as well as the fact that factories are moved to US territory, is part of the relaunch of American capitalism to which he offers the elimination of the regulatory tangle and also the fight against the Administrative State with the collaboration of Elon Musk.

Above all, he offers that what he says publicly will be the same as what he says privately, just as what he says inside and outside the country will not vary, and whether it is global warming or another issue, there will be no difference between what is said and what is done, he seems to assure.

Does this mean that there is a Trump Doctrine for the world? For now, until a less passionate debate appears, it is too risky to speak in such terms. To begin with, if there is light, there are also a variety of issues where darkness predominates. Be it the immigration issue, constitutional guarantees or justice, where he can find a power where decisions such as the suppression of the granting of birthright citizenship can be questioned, and whether the Department of Justice can be used to promote investigations similar to those directed against him. Here we are in the realm of darkness.

The truth is that the post-World War II world collapsed and nothing represented that world better than the one who was largely its creator, the United States, but today that role is being questioned as well as the status of undisputed superpower, to which Washington may have contributed by having lost deterrence, and a great mistake that was a byproduct of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, since the sanctions handed Russia over to China not only as an ally, which they had never been before, but also as a junior partner.

How Ukraine is negotiated will partially define the future, and the US needs to draw Russia away from China, its only real rival in the future, just as Nixon-Kissinger traveled to Beijing half a century ago to prevent a rapprochement with Moscow. But pressing the issue of Russia's relationship with China can hinder and delay a quick exit for Ukraine. If China participates in the reconstruction of Ukraine, it can delay a quick agreement, since being a candidate is not the same as being a president, since there is certainly no solution to a war in 24 hours and a single meeting, as was offered in the campaign.

@israelzipper

Master and Doctor (PhD) in Political Science (University of Essex, England), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona, Spain), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013).

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».