By: Ricardo Israel - 02/01/2025
One after the other, Donald Trump referred to Canada, Panama and Greenland, expressing his intentions and defining the policies he wanted for them. Apparently, despite the obvious differences, there seem to be common elements, and given the reaction they have had, could it be possible that his opposition could be missing the mark? Since it seems that it is not an outburst, and, on the contrary, there would be definitions and intentions to materialize, once his domicile is once again the White House on January 20.
As usual, there are theories circulating about the motivations behind the announcements, and it is possible that he is repeating the mistakes that some of his critics have made since he announced his intentions to run for president eight years ago. The mistake is to worry more about the form than the substance, which allows him to achieve his communication goal of dominating the conversation, taking advantage of the fact that he is suddenly offering Canadian provinces to become the 51st State of the United States, as well as the fact that he would propose to those who live in Greenland an autonomy similar to territories such as Guam or the Virgin Islands, and to Panamanians he seems to offer a status similar to that of Puerto Rico.
It certainly all seems too aggressive, but I think Wang Youming’s interpretation of the Beijing-based Institute of International Studies offers a motivation closer to what I think will happen during his presidency, ruling out the possibility of a military invasion: “Trump’s ultimate goal seems to be to negotiate better port rates for American ships” and the Global Times (linked to the Chinese Communist Party) added in English that it seemed like “a negotiating tactic”, considering that more than half of the maritime traffic of the Panama Canal is to or from American ports, which avoids the very long trip through Cape Horn. To achieve his purpose, Trump would seek to pressure the Panamanian government, which has already rejected his words, since the prices are established by a Panamanian but independent commission, generally prestigious, since it is well managed, although it is old technology, and despite the expansion, it cannot receive very deep-draft ships.
This is nothing new, since last year in the interview with Tucker Carlson on X (formerly Twitter), Trump asserted something for which there is still no evidence, that China “controls” and “manages” the Panama Canal, and there is no evidence, because it is probably not true, however influential his opinion may be, and not only in the Canal, but also that for the US, with weakened deterrence as has been made clear in various conflicts, it is easier to confront China there than in other parts of the world.
Who does Trump identify with in foreign policy? Does he follow anyone?
He clearly does not belong to any major currents, being neither liberal nor a realist. However, what he seems to be is an enthusiastic follower of the Monroe Doctrine of the 19th century, that of “America for the Americans,” in a 21st century version, this time not against Europe, but against China, along with another element of his international decisions, the personalization of those relations, that is, what appeared years ago with North Korea and its dictator, Kim Jong-un, and with mixed results, failing in the main objective of ending the atomic program but achieving better ties than today, since there was, although temporarily, a decrease in tensions, so much so that Kim might not have given soldiers to Russia to die in Kursk. It is also shown in statements where he says he hopes to quickly achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine, as soon as he resumes the presidency, implying that it would be a direct conversation with Putin. It is also noted in the invitation to Xi to travel to the inaugural ceremony of his 47th presidency (due to the number of his new presidency in the history of the institution).
Of interest in relation to what is expected from the Panama Canal are the words of a future official appointed as special envoy for Latin America. This is Mauricio Claver-Carone, a sanctions specialist who did not come out well from the top job at the Inter-American Development Bank, and whose appointment broke an unwritten agreement that the vice president should be someone born in Latin America and not just with a Hispanic surname. Without mentioning it, Claver-Carone spoke in terms of the Monroe Doctrine when he said that there was a “vacuum of control and influence” in the hemisphere, but that from now on “decades of American trade financing the growth of China and its strategic footprint in the Americas” were over.
Trump does not seem to subscribe to any of the major schools of international relations, since theory is not his thing. He does not seem to follow the one that proposes the institutionalization of international relations through the liberal scheme that has existed since the end of the Second World War, nor does he seem to follow the realist school that Henry Kissinger represented for the US, which ultimately recognizes that powerful states always have the need to impose geopolitical visions that can also be the result of negotiations with others of similar power, in order to avoid a resolution through war, because not only in his previous government, the 45th, but throughout his public career, contrary to what is thought, Trump in general rejects not the use and even the abuse of pressure, but rather that the conflict be resolved by military means, since his argument is that he wants to get the US out of wars instead of creating new ones, displaying his government as an example.
Neither liberal nor realist, but neither does he see a path that can always be identified. His approach is case by case, and in the absence of a recognizable school of international relations, we must return to the Art of the Deal, the book he published years ago with a journalist, and which allows us to better understand his motivations. Hence the force with which he is promoting the instrument of tariffs, since he believes that they better help MAGA, the growth or restoration of the power of the United States as a power, even in cases that are not reducible to a simple solution, as is the case with borders.
This style leads to situations where problems arise that can define, through success or failure, his legacy, and even the place of his government in the history of the country. One example is his reaction to those who are trying to diminish the importance of the dollar, a fundamental objective of the alliance between Russia and China, and of which Lula is today a spokesman, to whom Trump threatened to strongly raise tariffs if he continued trying to make the BRIC operate in that way. And the reason is easy to understand, since the role of the dollar as the world's savings and reserve currency is today, perhaps the greatest individual factor of power of the US, not only internationally, but also domestically, since the US continues to not pay, like other countries, all the consequences of its massive public deficit.
Returning to the subject of Canada, Panama and Greenland, the first thing to say is that, however different the motives and sizes may seem, there are common elements; second, that they were not spontaneous outings but rather there is a whole design; third, that they were not novelties, but rather it is not the first time that it has been expressed in this way, since in relation to those countries, ideas are taken up again that in a less elaborate form already appeared in his previous government or Trump 45, in addition to the fact that the reaction shows that although he has not formally assumed the presidency, his announcements are taken as if he were already the 47th president, which will only be as of January 20.
They are considered different options or operations, but they are all MAGA in its purest form, that is, definitions that coincide with the idea of the greatness of the United States, the basic reason for returning to the Reaganite idea of Make America Great Again.
In the case of Panama, China is the reason, given the fact that the US is by far the main user and wants to confront the Chinese presence in the hemisphere, due to the perceived involvement in the administration of the waterway. This situation had already arisen with the pandemic in its previous government, and now it is made more explicit, since presenting the name of who will be its ambassador in Panama, although it cannot turn back the clock, the harshness of its words indicate that it wants an agreement that grants special conditions to the US and for this it uses as a threat, the increase in tariffs. Given the importance of the Canal not only for trade, but also the movements of its Navy, it seems that it has defined that there are more favorable conditions than other places to confront China.
In the case of Greenland, the idea is not even its own, since the first offer of integration as the largest island in the world (in Australia, being a continent is preferred) came from President Truman at the beginning of the Cold War, since there was a base there during the Second World War. Even then, the offer included both the purchase and also the incorporation into the USA in some special capacity of autonomy, although, of course, its historical cultural location was and is in Scandinavia.
Furthermore, there was a public but not formal offer to Denmark during the previous Trump administration, and I believe that the same mistake was made in not taking it seriously, as was the response of the former Prime Minister of the Scandinavian country as well as the elected authorities, as a constituent nation of the Kingdom of Denmark, although with various signs of dissatisfaction on the part of the islanders.
Of course, the manners were harsh, then and now, far from the usual forms of diplomacy, but we must not focus only on the form, but also go to the substance.
Is Greenland important? Of course it is from a geopolitical point of view. Not only is it geographically part of North America, located in the northeastern area between the Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean, but from the US it is seen as a gateway to the Arctic, where Russia has been patiently building a new trade route to transport products to and from Europe, which was seen as promising by large shipping companies before the invasion of Ukraine, given the uncertainties caused by other routes, as is happening today, for example, with the Houthis, who have been successful in interrupting maritime trade in the Red Sea and towards the Suez Canal. Russia has even sought to use climate change to its advantage, by bringing previously submerged territories to the surface, where it has been planting its flag.
By the way, everything changed not only with the invasion, but also with the subsequent policy of sanctions as punishment for Moscow. However, the current alliance with China, where Russia is the subordinate element, makes visible the role of China as an investor, both for the Arctic project and as a very noticeable presence, in resources and immigrants in Siberia, which obviously is not the same, for these geopolitical purposes.
As in the case of Panama, the use of tariffs as a non-economic instrument to achieve objectives and shape behaviour appears even more clearly in the case of Canada, where there is also a desire to settle accounts with the current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, with whom there have been public disagreements in the previous government and now, given the weakness of the Canadian, who may have to leave office or call early elections.
In the Canadian case, there is also Trump's announced decision to pressure both Canada and Mexico to make decisions more to Washington's liking on issues of illegal immigration and drugs, across their common borders, while in the case of Canada, there is also the desire of the US to have more similar policies regarding oil and gas. Since Trudeau's case is a one-off, what really seems to interest Trump are the oil-producing provinces, upset with their prime minister and with the US since Biden cancelled the Keystone XL oil pipeline, already advanced by Trump, via executive order. A special recipient could be the province of Alberta, Montana's neighbor, prominent in hydrocarbons and the petrochemical industry.
Is Trump thinking specifically about them? I don't know, but his political behaviour has generally been more conservative than other provinces and governments like Trudeau's, and although Canada is not perceived as a power in oil and gas, in fact it is one and has great potential for growth, since it is a rich country, since it has 10.4% of the world's reserves.
Of course, in any of the three cases, any decision that goes beyond tariffs and means a loss of sovereignty for those countries and places will require a referendum (in the case of a constitutional amendment) or a plebiscite where it will not be easy for the US idea to gain a majority.
Beyond Canada, Panama or Greenland, the style demonstrated shows two things: that this time Trump is much more organized than the last time and second, that the resistance he encounters remains centered only on his overwhelming personality, that is, exactly what failed to stop his political rise, so that if successful he could generate a lasting change. In any case, this style shows that his collaborators, selected mainly for their loyalty, so as not to repeat the case of retired generals or his former National Security Advisor John Bolton writing critical memoirs of him, are going to have a problem, that is, those in charge of these issues are going to have to adjust to statements from the president that will surprise them at times, them and everyone, since these statements will acquire the status of official policy due to their automatic impact in traditional media and on social networks.
Of course, some analysts may also be mistaken, since so many years in traditional media such as television have given Trump knowledge and, above all, a nose for surprising, for changing the conversation. If his previous government serves to better understand his way of acting, in the 45th administration there were important officials who did not understand him in this way and ended up, if not fired, at least out of consideration for the current one, the 47th, while others who understood him now accompany him, sometimes, in more important positions.
In essence, he seems to be one of those for whom the important thing is to be talked about, as evidenced by the importance acquired by his triumph on November 5th both on social media and in podcasts, with the fact that those who do so being for or against being secondary is secondary. This is what Zygmunt Bauman explained years ago when defining the “liquid modernity” that characterised globalisation and the 21st century and which was later complemented by the Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han, who has had a great impact when defining in German the characteristics of today’s society, especially in the developed world.
The United States has been and is going through a massive political realignment, which is not over and whose duration will depend on how much success Trump has in this government as well as the magnitude of the failure, if the opposite occurs, there being probably 50% and 50%, possibilities that have increased in favor of Trump due to the way in which the number of followers seems to be increasing, for example, internationally, and with a sure impact on other countries, as long as he remains a leading potential.
In my opinion, rather than creating a movement, Trump providentially found himself with it, in the form of half the country that was looking for not just any change, but a profound one, at least in the narrative or story. Today, there are still two polarized sectors, and in both there are anti-democratic forces as well as well-intentioned people. In any case, if the movement was not Trump's creation, taking control of it, becoming its leader and, as a personal triumph, achieving a return to the White House, probably unprecedented in the entire history of the United States, was.
And these proposals for Canada, Panama and Greenland have in common that they are based on an idea, thought out and reasoned to become official policy. They come from within his presidential campaign, and are undoubtedly not the work of the so-called intelligence community or of the Deep State that he wants to destroy.
What era should we compare what we are witnessing with? Franklin Delano Roosevelt? Reagan? Another? Of course, Trump has a negative image, which is also true internationally. However, it is also true that Bush Jr. had a negative image when he occupied Iraq in the second invasion in 2003, as did Reagan when he exercised power, above all, for the impetus to the arms race that had such an influence on the virtual economic bankruptcy of the USSR. However, today his administration is viewed more favorably than it was in the 1980s.
Will something similar happen with Trump? We don't know, just as we don't know if he cares about not being loved, or if he follows Machiavelli's maxim that the Prince (that is, the ruler of that time) should be respected more than loved. Perhaps what he did before being a presidential candidate has an influence (he was once offered a candidacy by the now defunct Reform Party, which with Ross Perot and his votes had such an influence on whether the 1992 election was decided in favor of Bill Clinton). Trump became known as a real estate developer of large projects, including luxury ones, a career in which he received criticism similar to that which he has received in politics, but who, nevertheless, always tried to push forward those projects, despite the criticism and the critics, which were abundant.
In conclusion, I am convinced that I will write about these ideas again, not as a proposal, but as part of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) project of this Trump 47 administration, but once what is desired as the culmination of the respective negotiation emerges.
There may have been diplomacy, with a lot of threats, but no military resolution. In short, to understand what is happening, it does not hurt to (re)read The Art of the Deal. At least, it helps more than reading the classics of international relations, which I do not believe have studied in detail the behavior that has appeared in relation to Canada, Panama and Greenland.
@israelzipper
Master and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)
«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».