Two presidents for Venezuela?

By: Ricardo Israel - 12/01/2025

Will there be two presidents in the scenario that we have seen on January 10, the day that according to the Constitution the new president was supposed to be sworn in? As the winner of the July 28 elections, Edmundo González is the legitimate one, and as the loser, Nicolás Maduro is the illegitimate one, which makes him only a usurper, an illegal “squatter” who bases his actions on force and not on the law.

Will Venezuela repeat what it experienced with Juan Guaidó from January 5, 2019, which did not yield the expected results? He proclaimed himself interim or caretaker president, two parliaments and two supreme courts appeared, but Maduro could not be prevented from strengthening his power, causing Gaudió to lose presence and relevance. However, the difference with the days we are living is the victory at the polls that has not been able to be hidden or denied, but which still needs to stretch the scope of what is possible against the regime.

On January 10, Maduro brought forward the ceremony and was sworn in with the presence of Diaz-Canel of Cuba and Ortega of Nicaragua, the only heads of state who attended, by the way, without showing the voting records that have been so requested. From a legal point of view, his actions technically constitute a coup d'état, since he swore an oath of office that did not correspond to him, altering the popular will and violating the very constitution that he had promised to respect. The US raised the amount of the reward for his arrest to 25 million dollars (same amount for Diosdado Cabello), both for drug trafficking, and the European Union sanctioned a group of new officials. However, it is more of the same, and nothing is really expected to change.

For her part, María Corina Machado explained her feelings about her arrest the day before, which is further evidence of her courage and also announces a new escalation, since the regime had not previously resorted to such actions against her and justified the absence of Edmundo González, saying that he will arrive when the time is right, probably for security reasons. It remains to be seen who ordered his arrest and who ordered his release, which is key to knowing if there is a single voice of command or if we are witnessing different attitudes within the Chavista leadership, which is key to understanding the form that a negotiation can take, if this is possible.

Although the regime is still in denial, since July 28th there has been a Venezuelan-style transition, and like every transition it has similarities with previous ones as well as its own original elements, such as the fact that it has two heads in the persons of María Corina Machado and Edmundo González. Without a doubt, in order to achieve the best possible result against a regime that has entrenched itself and militarized, that does not care about isolating itself like Albania in the Cold War, much support is still needed, inside and outside Venezuela, and as internal support was demonstrated in the huge vote received in the elections he won, although he has no way to confront the violence of the regime while externally, the international community has not applied the necessary pressure, since in fact there have been few countries that recognize him as the president of Venezuela.

With Maduro's swipe, we don't know if he will give rise to a new migratory movement, which will probably not find facilities in the United States or in Latin America. The issue is relevant, since internationally, the great challenge is to shake off the drowsiness or perhaps fatigue in relation to Caracas, and since it is not possible to cover the whole world, hopes are pinned on a government that appears to be favorable, that of Donald Trump, which begins on January 20. Is this justified when Trump has said time and again that there will be no military interventions, since he is coming to put an end to them and not to start new ones? In fact, rather than being a totally new government, it will be more like the second stage, but without a doubt the decisions that are taken for Venezuela can define its legacy towards Latin America.

Of course, it will be different from Biden's, but that can be said of practically every area of government or decision-making. In this regard, it is unquestionable that with Trump in the White House and with Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, there will not be intermediate officials like Juan González, who as the White House's representative for Latin America, did everything possible to negotiate with Maduro instead of seeking democracy.

Moreover, it should not escape Washington's notice that Cuba and Venezuela are more united than is usually portrayed by the major English-language press in the US, which has been virtually occupied by Cuba, so that not only do the intelligence services have a lot of control but strategic decisions are made in Havana by Chavez, so much so that the current strategy of repression and entrenchment was probably defined there, and that the paid collectives and not just the armed forces and police figure prominently.

The situation with Cuba in Venezuela has instances of treason against the homeland, as well as being reminiscent of the Norwegian fifth column of the Second World War. For this reason, a basic question whose answer also includes the international community: How can Venezuela be liberated with the Cuban dictatorship installed there? A relevant consequence of this is another question: if Miraflores Palace knows that there will be no military intervention, what would the “maximum pressure” that is being talked about consist of? In a context where there would be no consensus between Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

However, what does not change is that the US is indispensable, in the sense that it is the only one that can convince the dictatorship, with a combination of carrot and stick, that there must be a clean exit and, therefore, negotiate, and whatever the exit, the democratic opposition must ensure that it will have some power, or at least, quotas of it, which, for example, allow it to veto last-minute surprises such as a real piñata to distribute among the friends of the regime, productive companies and the media, as in fact, has occurred in the transitions of other countries.

If not military intervention, what can we reasonably expect from the White House? That is, not what has been done so far and not even what has been done with Castro's Cuba to date, that is, real pressure in the form of an embargo and strong sanctions, similar to those suffered by apartheid South Africa and which convinced them to negotiate. And with Mandela's help, the rest is history.

One problem is the international press, which in English, in the format of CNN or the BBC, does not have an attitude of total condemnation, but only limits itself to reporting on the problem of the vote count and the attitude of assuming a position without any legitimacy, as there are others in the news coverage. It does not give an idea of what a narco-dictatorship is, how deep the repression is and how systematic the violation of human rights is, which undoubtedly influences the lack of interest of many leaders in European countries and in a sector of the US to understand the level of perversity of the Maduro dictatorship, so that in relation to the seriousness of the repressive violence and the kidnappings as blackmail, it is not seen that the international pressure is at the level that is needed.

The truth is that the attitude of the International Criminal Court, given the volume of evidence provided and the time elapsed, is a disgrace, and also a corrupt attitude if one sees the speed with which they have acted in other cases, where not even the countries affected had recognized it, and, therefore, were not part of either the Treaty or the institution, so strictly speaking they could not have done what they did, because they did not have jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the dictatorship was able to deceive the White House with its commitments to Barbados without consequences and with total impunity, for the same reason that at the beginning the democratic opposition in Venezuela had a hard time understanding that the codes of tyranny are not political, not even those of Machiavelli; moreover, they are not even those of the Godfather, since he rejected the sale of drugs. Its codes are those of organized crime and it is not appropriate to speak in terms of “21st century socialism” since that gives it an umbrella of support in Europe and Latin America. Its thing is clearly the Palermo Convention of the United Nations, organized crime.

What do democratic forces have in their favor?

That the transition has already begun, as fear of the dictatorship has been lost, which has allowed legitimate calls to the military to fulfill their constitutional duty, understanding that when force is legitimate, it has a role to play in resolving the terminal crisis that Venezuela is experiencing.

That is to say, the opposition already has a path from which it must not deviate, in the sense that it must not deviate from its role as the legitimate government. The transition has already begun, so the only luxury it cannot allow itself is what ultimately affected Guaidó: falling into irrelevance.

Today, despite everything, the opposition is in a better position to return to democracy than at any other time before, including those who were denied a legitimate victory (in 2018, for example). For his part, Maduro is becoming less and less credible with his threats.

This has escaped many analysts, so much so that some time ago The Economist headlined that in Venezuela the opposition “was being crushed”, although it is true that there was no fracture in the Armed Forces either at the top (generalship) or at the bottom (troops), but totally underestimating the problem that Castro-Chavismo has, which, except for violence (which also has a limit), does not know what to do with the popularity and legitimacy of a leader like María Corina Machado who managed to combine emotion with reason, and whose centrality is totally in the loss of fear, an important achievement since it is not just any dictatorship, but a narco-state. Some of this was manifested with her arrest on Tuesday, January 7, where Vente Venezuela reported “that she was taken away by force… (and) was later released”. A fact that demonstrates their desperation.

Now, the solution to the Venezuelan crisis could mark the future of democracy in Latin America, especially since a defeat of Maduro has immediate consequences for the mother dictatorship, the Cuban one, which seems to be experiencing its worst moment since the 1959 revolution, even greater than the disappearance of the Soviet Union. There is no time for a global crusade, which is another reason why the democratic opposition must concentrate on the United States with a realistic vision of what can be expected, and it is also possible that the Trump effect will fade or that other priorities will appear that will concentrate the attention of the government as soon as it takes office, such as, for example, Syria.

The impact will be greater in the United States if we achieve what we have not achieved so far: convincing people that Caracas has a serious national security problem, since the cocktail that the dictatorship has prepared is explosive with oil, drugs, massive corruption and the Aragua Train, that is, from exporting crime to opening the way for Iran and jihadism.

Without a doubt, the opposition can be proud of what it has achieved since it lost its fear of the dictatorship. The first achievement, before the other, was to have achieved the elusive unity, since, if it is difficult to overthrow a dictatorship of transnational organized crime, it is impossible to do so without unity. Not only was the election won at the polls and, very importantly, it was also won in the streets. Now, the focus is not on defeating one person, but on the regime, an entire system of repression and plunder, that is, theft and usurpation of functions.

What's been missing?

From January 10th, and regardless of the repressive threats, the winner must act as the one who is now the government, which must be done without complexes, since unlike the experience of Guaidó, now more countries will support them if they are perceived as the effective government, which also makes life easier for governments like Trump's to convince others. However, can this be done if no territory is controlled at the national level, nor is there anything that constitutes what the classics of the revolution called "dual power"?

In that sense, I think that one step that Gonzalez and Machado should take is not only to act on democratic countries, but also on those who have been the international support outside the region, that is, China, Russia, and Iran. I think that one of the first things that the legitimate government should do to undermine the regime's waterline is to open a public channel of dialogue with Russia and China, and to be received in Moscow and Beijing to talk about what interests them most, the issue of the debt and its payment, however distant in time it may be, since they are not countries that seem to have permanent interests in Venezuela.

As a legitimately elected government, they must also move forcefully against Venezuelan money and assets abroad while speaking as publicly as possible with the US on a topic of interest to the Trump administration and anyone else, which is the future of oil, including increased production and investments. Lastly, the dialogue with the ayatollahs must be different, in the sense that today they are in their weakest position since the beginning of the war with Iraq in the 1980s, and therefore at a difficult time to open other fronts.

This action may indeed annoy the regime and open an internal discussion, which would help another strategic objective, which should be to impose a negotiation on the regime, which has already given up on the peaceful solution that was offered to them. But if they accept a negotiation, it will be evidence of their exhaustion, and the photo of the opposition entering Miraflores will effectively be, if not the beginning of the end, at least of what Churchill called “the end of the beginning.”

The formality represented by the existence of negotiations is important not only as an example that the end of the regime is approaching, but it also helps to reduce the commitment of Russia, China and Iran. For its part, it is also important for the West, specifically the US, since it incorporates places of power such as the State Department or the Pentagon that are not exactly Trumpist, but places where he found difficulties with those bureaucracies in his previous government, and surely also in the next one. And for the return to democracy, it will always be important that, in relation to Venezuela, the power acts with criteria of State rather than of political party in power.

At the internal level, the strategy of acting without any complexes as the only legitimate government, I believe, must be accompanied by a double pincer on Maduro that can contribute to the many contradictions and internal struggles that he has, starting with Diosdado Cabello. The first is that since Venezuela is not Albania, Maduro's self-coup must be prevented from leading to an isolation that could potentially lead it to only having contacts with countries like Nicaragua, Iran, Russia or China and the support of transnational organized crime. Today they only offer to entrench themselves, which must be very far from what the vast majority of Venezuelans want, therefore, in parallel, as the new legitimate government, everything possible must be done to undermine the support that the regime still has in institutions that have been unconditional to it, such as justice, the electoral system, public officials, armed forces and police, where those who work there must be assured that the future also includes them, and that there is no desire for revenge, but on the contrary, for reunion. In other words, the dual objective is to divide the regime while the winners of the election maintain their unity.

For all the above, today Venezuela is all of us, since everything started with Chavez. In 1998 there was only one dictatorship in the region, the Cuban one, today there are four, in addition to democratic countries that make life easier for them, as is the case of Mexico. However, if Maduro falls, a perspective of democratic consolidation could open up, which ideally could put an end to the mother dictatorship, the Cuban one, experiences that demonstrate, like history, that freedom does not always end because of the strength of its enemies, but also because of the insufficient commitment of those who defend it.

@israelzipper

Master and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».