Trump, Venezuela and Cuba: How deep will the changes be?

By: Ricardo Israel - 18/11/2024

On January 10, 2025, the winner of the presidential elections is expected to take office, but everything indicates that a falsification will take place, since it will not be Edmundo González, but Nicolas Maduro, the loser, in what is not only an electoral theft, but an attack on democracy itself. In the US, Donald Trump has not yet taken office, nor has Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, who will do so on January 20. As a guide, it will be best not to see what happens from then on as something totally new, but as the second stage of a government, however, which will define its legacy, and how it will be remembered in history. Therefore, there will be changes, what is not known is which ones, and how deep they will be, although the concern in Havana and Caracas must be great.

In this regard, will Washington's behavior in the region change from January 20? How much? Will it be followed by other countries or will it be isolated? Will the number of countries be similar to those that recognized Juan Guaidó or will we witness something qualitatively different? In this regard, let us remember that only a minority of countries have imitated the gesture worthy of Lacalle's Uruguay, since so far, Russia, Iran and China have shown themselves to be more supportive of their protégé than the West has been with democratic forces.

All of the above has taken place in conditions where one very important element is relatively unknown to large audiences, as this time the English-language mainstream press does not insist and sometimes does not even mention the fact that Venezuela has been virtually occupied by Cuba, whose intelligence services have such control that strategic decisions have been made since the Chavez era in Havana, one of the factors that explains better than others what is happening in Venezuela. In other words, when Venezuelan democrats were able to prove to the world that Maduro had been defeated, it surprised not only the Caracas dictatorship but also the Cuban G2. This dominance is even a novelty, as it has been usual in history for the richest country to dominate the poorest, and not the other way around as happens in this relationship.

Given Cuba's ideological domination, the question is whether Venezuela can be liberated with the Cuban dictatorship installed there. Probably, and rightly so, they think in Havana that this nomenklatura would be next. But would it have any effect if the new administration tells them, even before taking office, that Havana will be held responsible? A message that will also be delivered to Russia, taking advantage of the upcoming dialogue on Ukraine.

Given the above, are we placing too many hopes on what the new administration can do? Without a doubt, it has the potential to mean a noticeable change, a renewed interest in Latin America, absent from US foreign policy for several decades, with responsibilities not only for the US but also for Latin America.

For now, in the US there is a general recognition that Latinos are not only the largest minority, but that for the first time they are recognized as having a political importance that was not abundant before. In other words, what is new is the acceptance of the Latino vote at a national level, and not only in Florida or Texas, and that these votes were decisive in an electoral sweep not only for president, but also for senators, representatives and the popular vote.

As of January 20, what can we expect from President Trump and his policy toward the region, with new appointees who must be confirmed by the Senate, unless the Republican majority grants them a kind of fast track? At the time of writing this column, there have been no announcements on the above, apart from the fact that the senators are particularly jealous of their powers. Everyone knows that the priorities will be in Ukraine and the Middle East, but at least it is expected that the US will recover the deterrence lost in front of Caracas and that situations such as the deception that Maduro played on Washington in Barbados will not be repeated, with total non-compliance with the agreements by Chavismo, and without consequences so far for the perpetrators. What is not known is where the devil usually lies, that is, the details. In this regard, how will the new administration act? Will it be a negotiation or an ultimatum? If it is the former, will both countries be seen together or as separate entities?

In this sense, let us remember the fact that Trump is accustomed to personalizing decision-making in foreign policy, although in this case, the presence after a long time, of someone like Rubio with a personal interest (and knowledge) in the subject can serve as a counterweight for a decision that will surely be made in Havana, but both Cuba and Venezuela have been accustomed to always expecting something in return, which is part of the deterrent deterioration of the power.

Will there be a chance of a consensus on international issues between Democrats and Republicans, or even if there is, would it take a long time, which this time is not allowed? And the starting point is that Venezuela being the country with the largest proven oil reserves, the US suffered a strategic defeat that it still does not recognize as such, as demonstrated by the inauguration of the very modern port built by China in Peru to take advantage of the presence of both Xi and Biden at the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit. The truth is that the US has nothing equivalent to offer in terms of infrastructure today, and so Beijing has become the main trading partner of most countries in the region, further confirming that the world of the 21st century is one of several players, and where Chinese economic power makes it a very different rival than the Soviet Union was in the last century, where the most striking thing is not so much the Chinese onslaught as Washington's long-standing indifference, a situation that is going to change, but at this point it is not known how much, and also whether, even if there is the will to act, if the US has the will to use all the considerable resources at its disposal.

We say the above because, up to now, there has been no will to confront the dictatorships of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua for the way they used illegal immigration as a political weapon against the US, without, for example, ending the benefits that free trade agreements grant to Managua and also to Tegucigalpa. In the same sense, it is still not clear whether Washington will demand a minimum consequence from the countries that claim to be its allies in the region, at least ending the fact that nothing happens if the US and its authorities are offended, as for example occurred at the Summit of the Americas that took place in Los Angeles in June 2022, in person by Boric or by those leaders like AMLO who simply did not attend because Cuba was not invited, a discourtesy that probably would not have been done to Xi at some international meeting where Beijing was the host.

Returning to the underlying issue, under the new conditions, does “maximum pressure” against Venezuela include the use of force? Apparently there is nothing similar on the agenda, just as Trump did not do during his previous administration, so that should be the starting point for any analysis, although, of course, not necessarily the end point.

Let us add that the role of Ambassador Abrams as a kind of delegated authority for the case of Venezuela should serve to have prudence and serenity in expectations, since it must be remembered that both Duque of Colombia and Piñera of Chile were invited to the city of Cúcuta on the Colombian side of the border, since the international press assured that there was some kind of understanding with the Minister of Defense Padrino López for a kind of coup d'état against Maduro. However, ultimately, nothing happened, since generals and admirals would have preferred to continue until today in the Cartel de los Soles, rather than run the risk that if there was a change of regime, international Human Rights legislation would be applied to them, for their proven participation in the repression of their compatriots.

Perhaps the enthusiasm would be justified by the presence of Senator Rubio in the State Department, but he has said more than once that he will put the interests of the United States above his personal desires. And in this regard, the case of oil can serve as an example, since its production has decreased greatly, so much so that Caracas is not a leading player today, in conditions that Trump intends to make oil production in the United States so relevant as a result of lower taxes, greater investment and fewer regulations, that Washington also has a role in setting the price, if it manages to become the main producer, in addition to defending the dollar, so that it remains the only currency of purchase and sale.

Although he has not yet taken office, the new and very important factor is that the Latino vote is of growing importance in defining elections within the US, which is recognized in appointments such as that of Senator Rubio, although there is no evidence that Latin American foreign ministries have a strategy to use what has happened to their advantage. For now, Trump is doing what he promised during his campaign.

Returning to what we pointed out in the first paragraphs of this column, in order to understand what is happening in Venezuela, it is essential to understand that Cuba occupies and controls, and that since Chavez himself there is an element of treason on the part of those in Caracas who have allowed the usurpation of national sovereignty by a foreign country.

It was not always like this, since in November 1961, President Rómulo Betancourt announced the breaking off of relations with Cuba in the name of the doctrine that bore his name, which consisted of not having diplomatic relations with governments that had come to power by means other than elections. This was before the US conflict with the USSR, over the installation of nuclear weapons on the island, the time when the world was closest to destruction in the 13 days of October 1962.

Venezuela had previously voted in January of that year to expel Cuba from the OAS and in July 1964 requested the imposition of sanctions after weapons were discovered on a Venezuelan beach for use by the Castro guerrilla group of the Armed Forces of National Liberation. Even more serious was the landing at Machurucuto, where in May 1967 the army thwarted an invasion that included Cuban officers to strengthen the guerrilla group of Douglas Bravo, who was trying to overthrow the democratic government of Raúl Leoni.

Why did Cuba act like this? For the same reason that would condition the relationship between Chavez and Castro: oil. Nothing new, since Castro's first trip abroad was to Venezuela on January 23, 1959, where he was received as a continental hero. On that trip, Fidel met with Betancourt, asked for a loan and proposed an agreement in which Caracas would sell oil to Cuba at a preferential price, also nothing new. However, Betancourt refused, which explains the subsequent evolution of events, including the armed aggression. At least since then it is possible to observe one constant in Castro: his desire for Venezuelan oil wealth to be functional to the revolution. Hugo Chavez would open that door for Castro to take even the furniture from the house.

This happened in two stages, the first shortly after the face of the Bolivarian revolution was released from prison, where in December 1994 he visited Cuba, being received by Fidel with the honors of a head of state, despite the fact that Fidel himself had personally denounced his attempted coup d'état in 1992, which would change after his still difficult to understand pardon by Rafael Caldera, just as there is no good explanation as to why in Cuba, Fidel was benefited and set free after his assault on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953.

The second stage comes immediately after the failed opposition coup in 2002, where Chavez clearly sought Cuban support to stay in power. In the transaction he gave up Venezuela's own sovereignty. From then on, Cuba would receive many barrels of oil and control of the country via the G2, the Cuban intelligence agency, with access to review all the levers of power, including military personnel, whose promotion, removal or imprisonment will depend on that scrutiny, in addition to its proven expertise in the repression of its own people.

Incidentally, Havana would also send social and medical programs to ensure the loyalty of voters. During this period, Castro would become Chavez's mentor, and according to witness testimonies, a personal dominance was established, influenced by the charisma and manipulation of a much more experienced and astute Castro, which was helped by Chavez's insecurity, as people close to both have written.

There is abundant evidence that in the end Chavez remained in Havana, physically disabled by his illness, and that it was ultimately the Cubans who decided that he would be replaced by Maduro and not by Diosdado Cabello, who, according to Chavista legality, was to hold the post in the name of the National Assembly, as he was the head of the legislative power. Even before that, in May 2008, during a visit as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maduro had described the relations between the two countries as “one of deep, lasting and strategic brotherhood, through which we have become one people, one nation.”

The question for which no answer has been given is, when democrats in Venezuela can assume power, what will they do in response to acts that undoubtedly constitute the crime of treason? Will there be trials?

We have witnessed a relationship that not only transformed Venezuela into the benefactor that Cuba needed after the USSR, but also Venezuelan money gave it a new political air, granting Havana even more power, in the sense that what was only Cuban subversion became Castro-Chavism with Venezuelan money. The Cuban regime survived and also increased the number of dictatorships, and with the help of Lula and the Sao Paulo Group it had a presence throughout the region, achieving at a Summit of the Americas (Mar del Plata, 2005) that the US proposal for a free trade area in the region was frustrated.

The way in which Cuban penetration into Venezuela was facilitated is not very different from what the Norwegian fifth column did to help Nazi Germany occupy that Scandinavian country in World War II. It is a story that leaves Latin America in a bad light due to its human rights violation component and also the United States as a power, that is, everyone disapproves of the way in which democracy retreated, undermining the progress achieved in the region, an additional reason for it to be incorporated as a crime against democracy in some future reform of the OAS Democratic Charter.

The role played by the Cuban occupation of Venezuela must be denounced. It is so important for the survival of both dictatorships that everything indicates that this influence will be used to keep Maduro in power. In the US, the change of government is an opportunity for it to understand that it must act. If it has not done so in the past, will it do so now? And the doubts that have arisen are based on the use that these dictatorships have made of illegal immigration as a weapon.

We do not know if there will be a change of the magnitude that the Venezuelan exile community desires. However, in any case, so far, the change in the US has had a discourse that reasonably allows us to expect very concrete differences with the government of President Biden.

On the other hand, the words spoken by Martin Luther King in the 60s still resonate: “To do the right thing, today is always the right time.”

- @israelzipper

-Master and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».