Is there a “Trump Doctrine”?

By: Ricardo Israel - 09/03/2025

I thought that his speech before the full Congress would allow him to clarify this, because it was the opportunity for a fundamental and substantive intervention. However, it was not, it seemed like another campaign act, describing his priorities. However, he was right, since, according to a CBS survey, 76% approved what he said.

In addition to the enormous echo chamber for everything that happens in the United States, it is difficult to think of many other examples where in just over a month the conversation has changed so quickly about what should be done in the country and in the world, with opponents and critics confused and retreating, although to be considered a doctrine, it lacks a fundamental requirement, permanence over time, since what has been experienced is essentially provisional, as long as what are legally only presidential orders are not transformed into laws, or there is a bipartisan consensus that allows the arrival of a government of a different sign to survive.

I am among those who are convinced that we are living in a time of change, one that can at least last for decades, especially since the Democrats do not seem to be offering any alternative.

Personally, in the past, faced with this type of occasion, which is more common than one might think, I have often resorted to a very powerful image that helps me a lot, when I ask myself: how will a historian of the future study what we are witnessing today, someone who, in 10, 50 or 100 years, looks back, trying to separate the urgent from the important, the spectacular from the transcendent?

What we are witnessing today is certainly striking, and I remember one of my grandfathers, who fought and was a prisoner of the Russians in the First World War, who used to tell me that the examples I used were no comparison with the year 1918, which saw the end of no less than four empires: the Tsarist Russian Empire, the German Kaiser's Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Turkish Empire. In addition, in 1945 two superpowers emerged, the USSR and the USA, and two large colonial empires, France and the United Kingdom, which have since become only medium-sized powers, a decline that has continued into this century.

We could cite other examples, but where would we include the possibility that Russia and the US might eventually become allies?

I am convinced that the historian of the future will not be as interested in political change as it is in our case. I think he will be more interested in the technological and cultural change that we are witnessing, for example, with Artificial Intelligence, since a major political change, whether national or international, occurs practically in every generation.

For many, the last important one occurred in the brief period between the fall of the Berlin Wall (9-XI-1989) and the dissolution of the USSR (26-12-91), the immediate consequences of which differ from what we witness today, since the foundations of the order that emerged after the Second World War were not questioned, but on the contrary, the defeated sought to integrate into the political and economic system that emerged there, as reflected in several countries that are now part of Europe and NATO, which certainly did not happen with Russia, since after Yeltsin, it took the opposite path.

There are also cases of announcements that simply did not produce the expected result, such as regional examples such as the so-called “Arab Spring” or the invasion of Iraq that ended in geopolitical terms with Iran controlling its former enemy.

So, in my opinion, what is Trump trying to do?

First is MAGA, or Make America Great Again, the principle that emerged with the Reagan administration, part of the common asset of conservatives and liberals in the US, but which at the time of his presidential victory in 1979 was (almost) as criticized as Trump is today, who added the idea of America First. Second is the rejuvenated Monroe Doctrine, now directed not against the old European colonial empires, but against modern China. It highlights the reappearance of the red lines that figured so prominently in the Cold War, that is, clarity about what the US is willing to do and what it will not do, so that it can be imposed, even harshly, against both adversaries and, and here is a novelty, against those who were supposed to be friends. Third is another of Reagan's ideas, that of Peace with Strength, applied not only to geopolitics or the military, but also to trade relations and the fight against drugs.

Therefore, in this doctrine there is a fourth point, which is the recognition of power, and if one analyses it realistically, the post-World War II liberal order was possible only because it was backed by the immense economic, political and ideological power of the USA, which contained the USSR, even though they often faced each other through third countries, a situation that could perhaps be repeating itself, now with Ukraine.

Furthermore, the international order that is disappearing or at least being challenged, including the territorial integrity of the member states, was actually born from the division of the world at Yalta, two atomic bombs, the Cold War, and if there was no direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR it was because of the existence of nuclear power and the fear of Mutually Assured Destruction.

That is to say, in the world that could be saying goodbye, there was a permanent conflict, present not only there, but also at other times in history, on the one hand, principles of international law (or before, the law of nations), and on the other, the principle of force of the great powers.

Trump's proposal, which has the potential to become a doctrine, is simple and concrete at the same time. There is nothing more to it, and there has been no intention of anything more. Trump came into politics without proposing a new movement, and in the past, the Reform Party, Ross Perot's creation, offered to nominate him as a presidential candidate, which he did not accept, and before 2016, he was a public figure for a long time, a highly prominent businessman, including buildings named after him, as well as a successful television personality for 15 years, who, due to his opinions, was imagined to be close to the Democrats.

In 2016, his candidacy was met with half the country believing that politics and politicians did not represent them, and Trump gave them direction and purpose, so much so that, to the surprise and error of the polls, he was elected. The US was divided, an expression of a long-standing cultural war. He was persecuted in court, but he won resoundingly, which allowed him to return much better prepared than the previous time.

Throughout this career, it has been made easier for him that his adversaries do not believe him, even though Trump has tried to turn what he promised during the campaign into government decisions, so much so that in his speech before the Full Congress he did not say anything that he would not have repeated before the crowds who came to listen to him, even during the pandemic, another phenomenon that his entry into politics contributed to.

There is much wrong with both the form and content of the criticisms he receives. In fact, contrary to what has been said, the fact that he appointed three members does not transform the Supreme Court into a Trumpist Court, since he has already suffered two important defeats there: first, his erroneous claim that the 2020 election had been fraudulent was not heard, and now his emergency request to freeze two billion in USAID foreign aid, part of Elon Musk's effort to reduce wasteful government spending, has been rejected. This represents two things: first, that these judges apply the so-called "right to be forgotten," that is, that they are not perceived as favoring those who put them there, and second, that the fundamental thing about the United States is not an imperfect democracy, but the republic, that is, the institutions, all, by the way, thanks to the Constitution.

Given the progress made on other fronts, there is now the impression that the Supreme Court could be an unexpected obstacle to what Trump intends to achieve, since since he was sworn in as the 47th president, the bad moment of his national and international rivals has been visible, in addition to the lack of leadership to confront him. This includes European leaders, since several of them seem like they could be defeated in their countries. Above all, at the national level, the Democrats are having difficulties in building an alternative, and in the case of the Europeans, their discourse of moral superiority, in addition to not achieving sufficient support, has already failed in the US.

Thus, unwittingly, what happened in domestic politics has been repeated internationally, that is, finding himself at the head of a movement that he did not create but which is recognising him as a leader, despite the fact that it had been brewing for a long time in Europe, with some successes, but now, the possibility of greater prizes is real in France and Germany.

There is no doubt that Trump is not liked by his opponents, but the big news is that it is also happening with friendly countries and leaders. Some think that it is just chaos that he has brought with him, but others think that there is a doctrine behind it. Either way, we are not witnessing the end of the world, but rather situations that have existed and will continue to exist, related to the political change that could have come to its time, locally or globally.

Particularly for Trump, this is something that has been repeated since he announced his candidacy in 2015, as the same error has been present, inside and outside the US, in the sense of not taking him seriously at the beginning, to the point of contempt abounding in some cases, despite a business history based on successfully overcoming not only commercial difficulties, but also numerous lawsuits.

In politics, being wrong about what he intends, from the macro to the micro, has been notorious in issues such as tariffs or Greenland. Perhaps there was some of that in Zelensky's mistakes in the Oval Office, where the issue is not mistreatment, since at that level power prevails over morality, but that only Ukraine could be harmed, so there is no doubt that he did not properly calibrate how he could react, however predictable it may have been, given his previous behavior. Today, it seems that the US wants the Ukrainian to resign, which reminds us that the equivalent was when Biden sought to force Netanyahu's resignation.

Where his opponents have erred is in assuming that Trump has certain intentions in relation to Putin, as they have been wrong more than once, since there are many opinions, but there is nothing to indicate that Trump is a puppet. Despite this, since the 2016 election onwards, it has been repeated that Putin had elected him, an assertion that is not only false, but also contributed to the subsequent polarization, perhaps as much as the events of January 6 in front of the Capitol.

The truth is that there is no indication that this has happened during his 45th term, where there were no special concessions, whether financial, economic or in arms negotiations. This has been confirmed recently with the announcement that tariffs and sanctions would be applied “on a large scale…to Russia until a ceasefire and a definitive peace agreement are reached.”

Not only with Russia over Ukraine, but it was also known that negotiations were underway with Hamas, even though it was said that they were just “talks,” although in truth they are not very different from what Israel has done, which does not call them negotiations either, and beware, Israel could also be in for a surprise. Trump has undoubtedly been a firm supporter, but he could perfectly make decisions that will not please Israel, since what he intends is pending from his previous government, so perhaps at some point in the near future he could support the creation of the Palestinian State by backing the Palestinian Authority, even though Netanyahu says that this represents something that the Hamas attack and hostage-taking made obsolete.

For his loyal base, Trump has installed the idea that he would be providential, at the right moment in history, to stop the decline of the US. For Ukraine, the negotiation proposed so far favors Moscow. For Trump, and probably for the US, everything makes sense if Moscow stops being a partner of China, the only real rival in this century.

Trump respects his rivals Putin and Xi Jinping, as he thinks that all three have a personal commitment to history, which is heightened in his case by the fact that he cannot seek re-election, so his window of opportunity is really a couple of years, since in November 2026 there are midterm elections to renew the House of Representatives and partially the Senate, and immediately the US will enter presidential campaign mode.

Trump understands or thinks he understands that the US is no longer the centre of the world, or at least it is no longer in an economic position to continue subsidising its allies, whether in trade or defence. And to continue being “the” superpower it must improve its military deterrence. In other words, the rebirth and resurgence of the US is what is his as the basis of the new doctrine, although there is often an idealisation of a past that did not exist. Without going any further, two points: first, what we know of Chinese intentions comes from the fact that they are imitating step by step what the US did to replace Great Britain. Second, the US did not always subsidise others, especially the weaker ones, since, in the Second World War, several Latin American countries were required to “contribute” to the war, punishing the prices of their raw materials, which represented US$ 500 million less in the case of Chilean copper.

It is a doctrine that is thought or presumed to be pragmatic and not utopian, that prides itself on having greatly increased investments in a short time, but which also speaks of “freeing the shackles” of the market, reducing not only regulations, but also waste in public spending, but at the same time invites us to think of a “new frontier” represented by Mars and the privatization of outer space, with the marked feeling that Europe has been left behind, that China is the only rival, and that, as demonstrated in Ukraine, Russia is a minor contender.

It is also a proposal that insists on reducing public debt, not only for economic reasons, but also for geopolitical reasons to defend the dollar as the world's reserve currency, since today it would be the best source of power that we have, so we must be willing to do anything to defend it.

If that is what he wants, what else is needed? For Trump, it is Atlanticism that is dying, since the post-World War II political and economic agreements with Europe now serve not only the US but subsidise a Europe in open decline, and above all, Trump respects success and power.

Atlanticism is an idea that became a state policy only in the 1940s, as a result of the Land-Lease Act of 1941 to provide military equipment to Great Britain at a time of isolationism in the United States and, above all, with the first document, the Atlantic Charter signed on the high seas by Roosevelt and Churchill, the basis of the future UN. Today, the policy contrary to Atlanticism is represented by the geopolitical current that presents Russia as having a presence in both Asia and Europe.

Just as I believe that those who see something different in this approach to Russia are mistaken, I believe that they are also mistaken with the issue of tariffs, since in the case of Mexico and Canada there is more of a war on drugs than a trade war, which is exacerbated in the case of Mexico by the fact that they do not want China to continue exporting through its companies registered in Mexico to take advantage of the free trade agreement. For Trump, reciprocal tariffs would be the solution to a problem for which, although there is not enough evidence, the idea is that the rest of the world continues to take advantage of the US.

In any case, it is one more demonstration that we must take seriously and not laugh at the importance that Trump attributes to his book The Art of the Deal, since the changes in dates and percentages show that they are part of a negotiation process, where the permanent thing will be that, if any country raises or lowers its tariffs, the US will do the same, something that is overlooked by those market analysts who do not adequately calibrate the geopolitical component, which when applied to China turns out to be as or more important than inflation. Besides, today China is doing the same.

@israelzipper

-Master and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

«The opinions published herein are the sole responsibility of its author».