Is Israel's response to Iran bringing regional war closer or further away?

By: Ricardo Israel - 27/10/2024

Israel was slow, not immediate, but it attacked Iran close to the Hebrew anniversary of the Hamas attack on October 7, which had no major impact on the possibility of a regional war, something that has been repeated over and over again since day one, especially by those who know the least about the region, and which has not materialized so far, nor does it seem likely to do so.

According to Netanyahu, it was “precise and powerful” – precise it was – but there is insufficient information to determine how much damage it caused or whether it deterred Tehran, with only the statement of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as a guide, whose recent comments were cautious that it “should neither be exaggerated nor minimized”, adding to his earlier description of it as a “miscalculation”, which it was not, as it was a well-considered decision.

The Israeli response had two characteristics, and although it is denied in Tel Aviv, there is no doubt that the first was the consensus that the US had to be listened to, which publicly asked that neither the nuclear program nor oil production be attacked. After a period where Israel did not respond or sometimes did not even inform, as was the case with the elimination of Nasrallah in Lebanon, this time there were frequent consultations with Washington, despite the fact that everything indicates that a top-secret report from US intelligence on the characteristics that the attack would have was delivered to Tehran by a high-ranking official in the Pentagon, according to the press with information attributed to the FBI.

The second feature was that Israel apparently decided that the attack should militarily serve as preparation for the (near?) future, attacking mainly two fronts, missile launchers (generally of Iranian manufacture), and above all, the most modern radars, the basis of air defense, generally purchased from Russia, following the pattern established in the previous response when Iran attacked in April, and the subsequent Israeli incursion reached the very places where some nuclear facilities are, destroying the Russian S-300 radars, without Israeli planes being able to be intercepted, either on entry or exit.

A similar situation occurred on this occasion, where they crossed Tehran several times without being located by the Iranian defenses, which apparently is one of the most valuable lessons of the incursion, which has shown Israel's military superiority in matters such as air power and intelligence. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to replace the destroyed radars soon, since they are needed for the invasion of Ukraine, especially in the perspective that kyiv will one day receive the requested weapons that would allow it to better attack Russian territory.

Although the Israeli entry was limited, the planners undoubtedly saw it as preparation for something deeper and broader, probably a later assault, once there is no doubt that Tehran is close to its longed-for atomic bomb. In this sense, the ease with which they entered in April and now in October, together with the fact that they suffered no casualties and eliminated launch sites, missile factories and sophisticated radars without the attacking planes suffering damage, give reassurance for future actions, which will undoubtedly be more ambitious, including the possibility of destabilizing the regime.

Listening to Washington this time always seemed the right thing to do from the point of view of Israel's national interest, since many of the American decisions regarding this war have been determined by their possible impact on the presidential election, which in its final days is tied according to most polls. Indeed, the easiest scenario for Israel of attacking oil production and the Iranian threat of affecting Saudi Arabia's would have had an immediate impact on the price of oil, with the potential to decide the winner of the presidential election, which, if it harmed Kamala Harris, would have created a distance between her and the Democrats, a relationship that is already difficult today, and with perhaps a long-lasting impact for Israel with its only essential ally.

The truth is that the various combat fronts have made Israel's international image suffer, although the favourable evolution of the war has allowed it to become increasingly less bad today. Militarily, the scenario has evolved favourably, but the political part has made very little progress due to the lack of a proposal from Jerusalem, and, above all, from the point of view of Israel's interests, the way in which the de facto alliance that Israel has with the Sunni Arab countries has survived is very positive.

And so it is, in general, these countries have not created problems for Israel, since nations such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates have understood the decisions, have maintained uncritical positions, understanding of Israel's military decisions, controlling their social networks, so that there are fewer demonstrations against Israel in their streets than in New York, Paris, Berlin or London, almost none in universities at least compared to Western ones, and there is no Arab country with which Israel has relations, whether public or private, that has broken them, as has happened in Latin America.

This helps to create a picture where Israel has military superiority over Iran today, as demonstrated by the two Iranian attacks on Israeli soil, where it received military support in April from the US, the UK, and even more importantly, from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and did not need that support in October, and with the common denominator to both that hundreds of missiles did not cause much damage in Israel, although the negative part was that they reached Israeli soil in a few minutes, and although they were mostly intercepted by the Iron Dome and the like, no one can guarantee that in the future they will not arrive with nuclear, chemical or biological material, instead of the current conventional content.

In addition to demonstrating superiority over Iran, Israel is militarily degrading Hamas and Hezbollah, so Tehran has lost a very important barrier of containment, since they surely created, spent and invested heavily in proxies so that they would suffer the cost of war with Israel, and the Islamic Republic would not have the need to do so directly, which is not happening, and the only certain thing is that the ayatollahs will be increasingly held responsible, who internally face growing opposition to the possibility of war, since the economic situation of the Iranians is bad and it is not understood why money is being spent in torrents on the destabilization of the Middle East and not on the social emergencies of the country.

The dire situation of its allies in Gaza and Lebanon shows an Iranian failure, and if Trump wins, the harsh sanctions imposed by the 2016-2020 government would undoubtedly return on January 20, in addition to no more returns of the money retained on US soil, as occurred in the Obama and Biden administrations.

Not only because of the damage it could cause Iran, Israel felt obliged to respond, since in a region where victory or defeat in a war produces a lasting impact, because in general only the winner is rewarded, something that is little understood in the West. In that sense, Israel needed to regain the deterrence it had lost with the invasion of October 7, including the loss of prestige of its intelligence, which it had regained in image with the recent successes that dismantled Hezbollah, even before entering Lebanon.

That deterrence has been restored with military successes, not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon and the damage caused to the Houthis in Yemen, which with the destruction of the port and the energy supply has produced a damage greater than that achieved first by Saudi Arabia, and later by the US and the United Kingdom (UK), which have not managed to avoid the interruption of international trade in the Red Sea, with very bad consequences for Egypt, due to the number of ships that today go around or avoid that route, greatly affecting the entrance to Suez, a situation that affects the image of a maritime power like the UK and above all, of one that is still the main superpower like the US, whose responsibilities also include looking after world trade and which should never have allowed itself to be blackmailed by a minor proxy like the Houthis.

Israel has not only attacked the Shiite militias attacking Israeli soil from Syria and Iraq, but it has also used radars in those countries to prevent them from alerting the Israeli planes that are heading towards Iran, since they are in the way. So far, it has been successful in deterring Syria, where it has been able, even with the tolerance of the Russian troops still present, to continue attacking Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard there, when it has been perceived that attacks against Israeli territory are being prepared. They are surely being followed with interest in other capitals, since there is now strong pressure from the Sunni Arab countries to distance Syria from Iran, offering it support and its reintegration into the Arab world. This is the case of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Emirates, Morocco.

Above all, Israel needed to attack Iran in order to maintain its de facto alliance with the Sunnis, who feel as threatened as Jerusalem by the atomic bomb that Tehran is seeking. This alliance has been cemented on the basis that in Israel they perceive a willingness to confront the ayatollahs that the US has long since ceased to display, more interested in negotiating. This alliance will only be maintained to the extent that they feel respect for Israel, which will depend greatly on the outcome of the war that was imposed on Israel and that is being waged with an increasing number of different actors.

The outcome of the US election will be a decisive event for all these groups and countries, as there are decisions up in the air today, such as how this war will continue as well as the one in Ukraine, as well as whether Saudi Arabia will get (it also depends on the composition of Congress) its Security Treaty with the US and although it acts autonomously in the pursuit of its armed actions, for Israel there is only one decisive country and that is the US, since no other, despite doubts and whims, is available to provide such decisive support, from weapons to the UN Security Council, as the power.

One of the things Israel has already decided on is probably to continue its campaign against the proxies, since it will not be able to have better security on its borders for a long time, since, until very recently, Hamas and Hezbollah made it impossible with their daily attacks and the subsequent daily response.

In Gaza, however, there is still one unresolved issue, one of Israel's most important objectives and the most important card Hamas holds, which is the fate of the hostages, 101 of whom are still missing, although there is legitimate doubt as to how many of them are still alive. Here, the US experience of offering money and a change of country and documentation for those who provide information can be very useful, as was demonstrated in the case of Saddam Hussein. Israel has also tried this, but without success, so an American role can also be attractive for politicians in that country, and there are also hostages of that nationality.

Israel also lacks - at least publicly - a political plan for Gaza, which prevents the participation of Sunni governments in, for example, the reconstruction and the formation of a government without Hamas, but it must achieve the support of the Palestinian Authority, and in my opinion, the participation of Arab countries in the search for an agreement that allows progress in the Palestinian State is basic for the Middle East. I insist on this point, since here the solution must be found, first with the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, and the Arab presence, in my opinion, is much more relevant than a European participation, for example. Ideally, the UN's role would be less, given the evidence that now exists of activists who at the same time as working for the UN are militants of Hamas in Gaza or of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Hezbollah is also the most important player in drug trafficking in the Middle East, since it obtains a significant part of its income (which helps finance its political activities and social security for the Shiite minority in Lebanon), without the UN or Western countries complying with their own agreements on the punishment of drug trafficking. In addition, the war has allowed the discovery of information that has supported allegations made about Hezbollah's penetration in Latin America, both by the Argentine Minister of Security and by the Israeli Ambassador in Costa Rica, denouncing the person in charge of Hezbollah for Latin America with his photo and name in the first case, and in the second, about units of that group that have been installed in Nicaragua and Bolivia, joining those that exist in Cuba and Venezuela, the latter country having given passports to hundreds of terrorists, according to the other complaint.

The military has made progress, but without a political plan it is very difficult to make progress towards peace, and Israel has the characteristic of triumphing militarily in wars that it did not start and that are imposed on it, but failing in the objective of peace, perhaps probably due to the lack of political plans, after the military triumph.

The presence of the Sunni Arab countries is also key to what has been lacking since before the creation of the State of Israel, that is, interlocutors who are committed to peace and who are willing to live together with a neighboring Jewish State, two States, one next to the other and not one in place of the other, as has been intended, first by the Arab League and then by Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), just to mention those who have participated in the negotiation processes, without forgetting that the original UN resolution spoke of a Jewish State and an Arab State, since the PLO was only born in the 1960s, a situation that helps explain why the West Bank was occupied by Jordan and Gaza, by Egypt until the Six-Day War in 1967.

But this is not about discussing history, but about taking advantage of the opportunity to talk about the future, since there simply will be no agreement on the other, and today, peace is best served by strengthening the participation of the Arab countries in this new phase. Like the Islamic State, the Chechens or Al Qaeda, Hamas is not going to disappear, but Israel can claim to achieve the same thing as the US or the Russians, that these groups have an occasional presence in terrorism, but that they do not have the possibility of taking power, forming a government or interrupting a peace process.

@israelzipper

Master and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Bachelor of Laws (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former president of the Committee on Armed Forces and Society of the International Political Science Association (IPSA)

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